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Promoting democracy implies fostering political empowerment and self-
determination. Although this creates obvious problems for any external policy 
seeking to change authoritarian regimes, mainstream thinking on 
democratization in the case of post-transition countries would predict a 
somewhat easier task for potential democracy promoters: cooperation with 
the elected government strengthens the democratic regime, while democracy 
assistance that supports institutional capacities and civil society participation 
simultaneously contributes to the protection and deepening of democracy. 
This article argues that such a view is far too simple. In the broad range of 
‘normal’ post-transition countries, democracy promotion can be confronted 
with a variety of conflicts of objectives associated with the fact that there is 
no democracy without some kind of self-determination and no process of 
democratization without some degree of political empowerment. The article 
presents a typology of these conflicts of objectives and applies it to the case 
of Bolivia. Subsequently, it offers an analysis of how two important 
democracy promoters in the country – namely, the US and Germany – reacted 
to Bolivia’s ‘democratic revolution’ and handled their respective conflicting 
objectives. 
 




Democracy means self-determination of the people; democratization entails political 
empowerment. How, then, could these two processes possibly present a challenge to external 
democracy promotion? There is no question that in dealing with non-democratic regimes, the 
dual aim to support democratization as a process of regime change and democratic self-
determination as a result is intrinsically contradictory: The former implies participation in the 
                                                 




toppling of an existing regime, an activity clearly in opposition to the notion of self-
determination. More specifically, it is commonly acknowledged that processes of political 
empowerment associated with the introduction of democratic institutions may increase the 
risk of violent conflict. Such processes can overburden the capacity of state institutions ill-
prepared to handle broad-based political mobilization and participation, threaten entrenched 
authoritarian elites, or incite empowered majorities to turn against (e.g. ethnic) minorities.
1
 
Consequently, the idea that democracy promotion is the best way to foster peace both 
within countries and internationally is increasingly being called into question, especially in 
light of recent experiences with regime change in Iraq and Afghanistan.
2
 However, this 
critical debate on the premises of external democracy promotion has focused on the 
prominent and particularly difficult cases of coerced regime change, the democratization of 
authoritarian regimes, and the implementation of democracy in post-conflict societies. This 
tends to create the illusion that these important but specific problems do not affect the day-to-
day business of democracy promotion concerned with strengthening political institutions, 
supporting civil society, and dissolving ‘democratic defects’ and ‘authoritarian legacies’ in 
regimes that are, at least in a basic sense, already democratic. In such post-transition 
countries, the agenda for would-be democracy promoters is largely seen as straight-forward: 
Cooperation with the elected government strengthens the democratic regime, while 
democracy assistance that supports institutional capacities and civil society participation 
simultaneously contributes to the stabilization of democratic institutions (protection of 
democracy) and to improving the quality of the democratic regime (deepening of democracy). 
Certainly, there is a wide-ranging debate about the (limited) impact of democracy promotion 
and the best strategies and measures to be implemented under various circumstances.
3
 
However, this debate has focused on problem-solving within an unquestioned agenda of 
democracy promotion and largely avoids critical examination of the normative and conceptual 





This article argues that also in the broad range of ‘normal’ post-transition countries, 
democracy promotion is regularly confronted with a variety of conflicts of objectives. The 
article examines the plausibility of this general argument with regard to democracy promotion 
in Bolivia, and namely US and German reactions to the ongoing transformation of Bolivian 
democracy. Two of the research questions outlined in the introduction to this special issue are 
addressed: (1) What are the conflicting objectives in democracy promotion? (2) How do 
democracy promoters deal with these conflicts? Regarding the first question, the article 
presents a typology of conflicts of objectives associated with self-determination and 
empowerment in post-transition countries, and applies this typology to Bolivia’s ongoing 
democratic transformation. The main empirical part of the article investigates the second 
question, analysing how two important democracy promoters in the country – the US and 
Germany – reacted to Bolivia’s ‘democratic revolution’ and handled their respective 
conflicting objectives. 
The case of Bolivia has been selected because it represents a fairly easy case for 
democracy promotion. Following a turbulent transition to democracy in the early 1980s, 
Bolivia has now experienced almost three decades of continuous democratic rule. In the 
1990s, the country was regarded as a development model that successfully combined 
democratization, stabilization, and (neo-)liberal economic reform.
5
 Identification of conflicts 
of objectives in the Bolivian case would therefore strongly support the claim that these are 
general phenomena and are not limited to very specific difficult circumstances. A comparison 
of US and German policies towards Bolivia is promising because of the diverging profiles of 
these two ‘donors’: The US has important tangible interests in Bolivia, especially concerning 
the so-called ‘War on Drugs’, and thus severe extrinsic conflicts of objectives (democracy 
promotion vs. donor interests) can be expected; for Germany, Bolivia is mainly relevant only 
as a recipient of German development aid, and thus the intrinsic side of the conflicts of 




interests. The case studies trace US and German reactions to political change in Bolivia by 
drawing on secondary sources (including media reports), official documents (including data 
on foreign assistance), and interviews conducted in Bolivia, Germany, and the US.
6
 
The article starts by presenting a typology of the conflicts of objectives that 
democracy promoters can be expected to face in post-transition countries (second section) 
and, then, applies it to the case of Bolivia (third section). Subsequent sections analyse how the 
US and Germany reacted to Bolivia’s ‘democratic revolution’ (fourth section) and compare 
how they handled their respective conflicts of objectives (fifth section). 
 
Self-determination and empowerment as challenges to democracy promotion 
In a basic sense, the conflicts of objectives that are potentially relevant for post-transition 
countries correspond to those usually discussed in relation to the democratization of 
authoritarian regimes and post-conflict societies (see above and the introduction to this 
Special Issue). This is due to the fact that promoting democracy in countries that have 
established at least rudimentary democratic institutions also implies democratization, albeit a 
further democratization of the existing democracy. Of course, improving the quality of – or 
deepening – democracy can refer to any of the multiple dimensions of democracy, including 
the strength and capacity of democratic institutions and the rule of law. However, questions of 
political empowerment and national self-determination are obviously relevant here: 
Democracy as it exists in particular in developing countries (countries usually featuring sharp 
social inequalities and/or high poverty rates) is characterized by extreme asymmetries in de 
facto political participation, representation, and responsiveness; at the same time, asymmetric 
inter- and trans-national interdependencies mean that national sovereignty as a condition for 
democratic self-determination is particularly constrained in the developing world. Promoting 
democracy under such circumstances should include actions to reduce these asymmetries by 




scope for national self-determination. 
The very nature of democracy as self-determination and of democratization as political 
empowerment, however, gives rise to conflicts of objectives in post-transition countries.
7
 I 
propose to distinguish four types of conflicting objectives (see Table 1). 
 
Table 1: Conflicts of objectives 
 
The political empowerment of marginalized sectors of society, when successful, entails at 
least a partial change in political elites and should have an impact on a given country’s official 
political preferences, if there is any real substance to democratic self-determination. Given the 
highly asymmetric distribution of economic welfare and political power in the contemporary 
world, such changing preferences (driven by formerly marginalized sectors in relatively 
disadvantaged countries) will often challenge the economic and political privileges of those 
‘North-Western’ countries that usually engage in democracy promotion. Such deviance from 
donor preferences might concern not only tangible economic or security interests, but also 
divergence in terms of the concepts of what democracy and ‘good’ governance are.
8
 In each 
case, the recipient country, based on its claim for national self-determination, will challenge 
donor preferences. For democracy promoters, the democratically driven divergence from 
donor interests – (1) in Table 1 – and universalist donor conceptions of ‘good, democratic 




of democratic self-determination or not. 
The empowerment and inclusion of marginalized sectors of society requires the 
redistribution of political power. However, the democratic state (like any state) 
institutionalizes social power relations; post-transition democracies are regularly built on 
(institutionalized) pacts and social compromises, and, in general, democracy under conditions 
of structural social inequalities depends on systematic limits to democratic participation in 
order to prevent the elites from defecting from the democratic rules of the game.
9
 Thus, 
empowerment in the sense of enhanced participation by marginalized sectors requires 
levelling the democratic playing field, which may include profound institutional and possibly 
constitutional change. The attempt to redistribute political power can therefore lead to a 
dismantling of the democratic institutions that are already in place. At the same time, the 
empowerment of marginalized sectors, regardless of whether they are accompanied by 
institutional change, may give rise to radical demands for the redistribution of economic 
resources and political power. If this is met with resistance from threatened elites (including 
privileged middle sectors), polarization can lead to an escalation of violent conflicts with the 
looming threat of civil war. In either case, empowerment in the recipient country clashes with 
the donors’ aim to protect a stable and peaceful constitutional order. Rising tensions between 
the goal to increase the political participation of marginalized sectors of society, on the one 
hand, and to protect existing democratic institutions – (3) in Table 1 – and uphold intra-state 
peace – (4) in the table –, on the other, prompt questions of whether too much political 
empowerment could eventually threaten democracy. 
The conflicts (1) and (2) in Table 1 refer to contradictions between donor and recipient 
preferences; the conflicts (3) and (4) emerge from contradictory developments within the 
recipient country that lead to conflicting objectives on part of the donor. Following the 
distinction by Spanger and Wolff
10
 adopted in the introduction to this special issue, types (2) 




promotion clash, while types (1) and (4) concern extrinsic conflicts: here, the aim of 
democracy promotion clashes with other objectives (donor interests or intra-state peace). 
 
The transformation of democracy in Bolivia 
Between 2000 and 2005, Bolivia experienced a series of political crises. Massive social 
protests forced the resignation of both President Sánchez de Lozada in 2003 and his successor 
Carlos Mesa in 2005. In the course of these crises, Evo Morales, a union leader, coca grower, 
and the head of the Movement towards Socialism (MAS), established himself as the leading 
representative of the diverse protest movements. In December 2005, Morales was elected 
President of Bolivia by an absolute majority of the vote and became the country’s first 
indigenous head of state. Following his election, Morales initiated a period of profound 
political change that included the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and the adoption of 
a new constitution (by referendum in January 2009), as well as a change in economic and 
social policies exemplified by the ‘nationalization’ of the hydrocarbon sector – Bolivia’s most 
important export sector – and a series of social programmes. In December 2009, Morales was 
re-elected with 63% of the vote, and his MAS party won a two-thirds majority in the new 
parliament. This article examines the period of Morales’s first term as president (2005–2009). 
With regard to democracy promotion, five characteristics of Bolivia’s self-proclaimed 
‘democratic revolution’ stand out. 
First, the democratic legitimization of the government and the overall process of 
political change stands in contrast to the series of procedural irregularities and outright 
breaches of constitutional and administrative law that have occurred during the period 
between 2005-2009. While impressive electoral victories since 2005 have demonstrated that 
Morales and his MAS party can rely on solid support from a clear majority of the population, 
the process of constitutional reform has been accompanied by controversial acts. For example, 




Constituent Assembly by a two-thirds majority of the members of the Assembly present at the 
time of voting, while the most important opposition groups had boycotted the vote. Following 
nine months of political struggle, a two-thirds majority in Congress agreed to a detailed 
revision of the constitutional draft; this procedure lacked any legal basis, but was crucial for 
enabling the constitutional reform to be accepted even by a significant part of the opposition, 
thus preventing further escalation of the political conflict.
11
 
Second, in terms of representation and participation, the quality of Bolivian 
democracy has improved, but there have been at least temporary declines in institutional 
controls and in transparent and rule-bound (‘good’) governance. Both the government and 
parliament are considerably more representative today than ever before, and political 
participation (measured by participation in elections, among other factors) has clearly grown. 
At the same time, the restructuring of political institutions has meant that respect for the 
established institutional order was low; during the process of constitutional reform, old 
institutional controls and procedural rules were gradually dismantled before new ones had 
been established. Disputes between the government and the highest branches of the judiciary 
escalated, with the latter gradually losing their authority due to a series of resignations that 
were not followed by new appointments. 
Third, the profound restructuring of the political system has generally been in 
accordance with the usual standards of democracy and human rights, but includes significant 
deviations from more specific liberal-democratic (donor country) conceptions. The new 
constitution includes the classical set of political and civil rights, and the new political system 
is dominated by mechanisms and institutions of representative democracy. However, this 
basic liberal-democratic order has been amended and modified in nontrivial ways: Indigenous 
(customary) law has been established as a second judicial system of equal status alongside the 
ordinary legal system; indigenous collective rights now permit self-government in 




indigenous minority groups in rural areas elect their delegates to the national parliament 
through special electoral districts; mechanisms of direct democracy such as recall, 
referendums, and popular legislative initiatives have been established; the highest branches of 
the judiciary are now to be elected by popular vote; and ‘organized civil society’ has gained 
vaguely defined but potentially far-reaching rights to participate in the design of public policy 
and to control public administration. Furthermore, social and economic rights now clearly go 
beyond anything generally found in established liberal democracies, with possibilities for 




Fourth, changes in economic and social policies promoted by the new government, 
while in line with a solid majority of the Bolivian population, differ significantly from both 
US and German conceptions of ‘sound’ development policies and from US and German 
economic interests. The most important example here is the policy of nationalization, 
particularly (but not exclusively) in the hydrocarbon sector. In general, international 
companies have been forced into new contractual relationships, the control by the state (and 
state companies) of the affected sectors has been strengthened, and fiscal participation 
(royalties and taxes) has increased. Another example of political deviance from donor 
interests – that specifically concerns the US – is connected to the policy of coca eradication: 
The Morales government has shifted from the US-style ‘War on Drugs’ (that had included the 
coerced eradication of coca plants) towards a combination of cooperative coca eradication and 
continuing counter-narcotics efforts against drug trafficking. 
Fifth, the political inclusion of anti-systemic social movements contributing to 
political stabilization and a de-escalation of the conflict between the state and these 
movements has been accompanied by a political marginalization/alienation of the former 
political and economic elites, thereby reinforcing regional and ethnic divisions, political 




Sánchez de Lozada in 2003, it had become virtually impossible to govern the country against 
the will of the ‘popular sectors’, as represented by the social and indigenous movements. Thus 
it was expected that Morales’s election would lead to political stabilization. Indeed, although 
social protests led by a diverse spectrum of popular-sector groups continued throughout 
Morales’s first term in office, he initially brought relative stability to the country; however, in 
the context of the constitutional reform process in particular, serious political disputes and 
social conflicts resurfaced. The opposition now came from regional autonomy movements in 
the south eastern lowland departments (the so-called media luna), led by the elected 
governors of these regional governments and ‘civic committees’. In September 2008, protests 
in the opposition-dominated lowlands peaked; cities, streets, and gas pipelines were blocked, 
federal institutions were occupied, and violence escalated between oppositional and pro-
government groups. 
From the very beginning, the ‘democratic revolution’ initiated by Morales has 
represented a series of challenges to German and especially to US policies. The rejection of 
‘neo-liberal’ economic policies and the US-driven ‘War on Drugs’ compromises the 
development strategies promoted by the US and Germany and directly affects their economic 
and security interests. In addition, the political transformation promoted by Morales deviates 
from the model of democratic governance to which the US and Germany adhere. In actual 
fact, this transformation meant replacing the democratic institutions that were established 
after the transition to democracy in the 1980s (with active support from both the US and 
Germany). In this sense, the first three characteristics of Bolivia’s process of political change 
– which refer to the contradictory nature of the transformation of democracy – lead to intrinsic 
conflicts of objectives on the part of external democracy promoters: the emphasis on self-
determination, including related principles such as alignment and ownership, clashes with the 
donors’ universalist notions of what good democratic governance means (self-determination 




institutions, good governance standards, and the rule of law (empowerment vs. protection of 
democracy). The fourth and fifth characteristics – which point to the policy changes and the 
political polarization that have accompanied Bolivia’s ‘democratic revolution’ – implicate 
extrinsic conflicts of objectives: here, democracy promotion becomes at odds with specific 
donor interests and potentially threatens intra-state peace. 
 
US and German reactions to Evo Morales 
Before the premature end of Sánchez de Lozada’s second presidency in 2003, the US and 
German interactions with Bolivia were characterized by good bilateral relations. In the case of 
US foreign policy, close bilateral relations at the time generally included support of 
democratic governments and, in particular, of elected presidents in times of domestic political 
crises. US support to Bolivia primarily consisted of diplomatic approval, trade preferences, 
and financial and technical assistance, all heavily focused on cooperation with the US-driven 
‘War on Drugs’ and involving a high degree of direct political involvement in Bolivian 
domestic affairs. Germany has been far less exposed and committed in Bolivia, but again, 
bilateral relations have traditionally been good and for the most part smooth. German support 
to Bolivia’s elected governments has primarily consisted of development assistance; in 
general, German foreign policy towards Bolivia is mainly development policy. With regard to 
democracy assistance, US and German development aid to Bolivia has encompassed a range 
of projects explicitly intended to strengthen democratic institutions, processes, and actors (see 
below). The following analysis examines how the US and Germany reacted to Morales’s 
election and administration and the resulting conflicts of objectives, in terms of both 





The United States 
Diplomatic Relations 
Following Morales’s election, the US took a wait-and-see approach. The official line was to 
‘congratulate the people of Bolivia on a successful election’, but also to emphasize that ‘the 
behavior of the new government’ would determine the course of the bilateral relationship: ‘It’s 
important that the new government govern in a democratic way […].’
13
 Even prior to the 
election, the US government had taken a low-key attitude, a significant difference to the 2002 
presidential election, during which then Ambassador Manuel Rocha openly threatened the 
possible withdrawal of US assistance if the Bolivian people dared to elect Morales. There 
were no negative repercussions, even when the newly-elected Morales called President 
George W. Bush a terrorist and appointed a cabinet that was widely perceived as friendly to 
the indigenous and social movements and critical of neo-liberal economics and the US ‘War 
on Drugs’. The US Embassy in La Paz even signalled its willingness to shift the focus of its 
policies on coca eradication towards a fight against cocaine and ‘surplus’ coca only.
14
 
Given the history of hostile relations between the US government and Morales, 
bilateral relations during the first two years of the Morales presidency were remarkably calm. 
Although both sides made critical statements, their impact on US policies and bilateral 
relations was fairly limited.
15
 For example, in June 2006, the Assistant Administrator of the 
US Agency for International Development (USAID), Adolfo Franco, stated that the Bolivian 
government had ‘on several occasions, demonstrated inclinations to consolidate executive 
power and promote potentially anti-democratic reforms through the Constituent Assembly and 
other means’.
16
 In September 2006, President Bush expressed concern ‘with the decline in 
Bolivian counternarcotics cooperation’.
17
 The Director of National Intelligence at the time 
John Negroponte, in 2007, stated that he viewed democracy as ‘most at risk in Venezuela and 
Bolivia’. ‘In both countries, the elected presidents, Chavez and Morales, are taking advantage 






return, the Bolivian government periodically rejected US ‘impositions’ and accused the Bush 
administration of using US assistance to support the opposition and destabilize Bolivia.
19
 
In 2008, the situation changed dramatically from rhetorical tension to ‘diplomatic 
breakdown’.
20
 In June 2008, the cocalero movement and local mayors from Bolivia’s largest 
coca growing region, Chapare, declared they would not sign any further agreements with 
USAID and de facto expelled USAID from the region, a decision endorsed by the Bolivian 
government. In September, amid a severe domestic political crisis provoked by the autonomy 
movements in the south eastern lowlands, Morales declared US Ambassador Philip Goldberg 
‘persona non grata’, accusing him of supporting opposition forces. The US government 
retaliated by expelling Bolivia’s Ambassador to Washington. A few days later, President Bush 
declared that Bolivia had ‘failed demonstrably’ to adhere to its ‘obligations under 
international counternarcotics agreements’. Bush avoided the automatic termination of US aid 
by declaring the bilateral programmes in Bolivia to be ‘vital to the national interests of the 
United States’.
21
 However, ‘decertification’ meant that Bolivia lost access to US trade 
preferences in the framework of the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act 
(ATPDEA). The Bolivian government responded by expelling the Drug Enforcement 
Administration (DEA) from the country. 
In addition, Bolivia lost access to funding from the Millennium Challenge Account 
(MCA). In 2004, Bolivia had been selected as eligible for the MCA by meeting conditions 
concerning ‘ruling justly’, ‘investing in people’, and ‘encouraging economic freedom’. In 
December 2008, however, the Board of Directors of the Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC) decided not to re-select Bolivia. Although the country’s scores on three governance 
indicators that are relevant for MCA eligibility had actually declined, comparisons with other 
MCC beneficiaries and interviews in Washington suggest that this gradual deterioration alone 







In order to rebuild bilateral relations with Bolivia, the incoming Obama 
Administration launched a bilateral dialogue with the Bolivian government. The first 
meetings were held in May and October 2009. However, Obama refrained from reinstating 
Bolivia’s trade preferences and, in September 2009, again ‘decertified’ Bolivia. Bolivian 
authorities responded by continuing to accuse the US of supporting opposition groups. In this 
context, neither side could agree upon a new framework for bilateral cooperation. 
 
Development cooperation and democracy assistance 
The decline in US foreign aid to Bolivia preceded this deterioration in overall bilateral 
relations. It originates from Mesa’s interim government (2004–2005) and continued 
throughout Morales’s first presidency (2006–2009): The total US foreign assistance per year 
declined continuously from more than $150 million per year in 2002–2004 to less than $100 
million in 2008 and 2009. US assistance remained significant, however, and the request for 
Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 even sought to increase the flow of aid, signalling an interest to remain 
engaged, albeit at a lower level than in the early 2000s.
23
 
Officially, continued foreign assistance to Bolivia was justified by persistent local 
needs, especially with regard to narcotics control, poverty reduction, and democracy 
promotion, 
24
 but it was also to serve US political interests. Following the election ‘of a 
government that campaigned on promises that included decriminalizing coca and 
nationalizing private property’, the US felt the need to demonstrate ‘flexibility to protect our 
core interests’; flexibility here meant trying ‘to engage with the new government (as 
circumstances allow)’, but also with ‘the military and, particularly, the regional 
governments’.
25
 Indeed, the new programme Strengthening of Democratic Institutions 
(Fortalecimiento de Instituciones Democráticas, or FIDEM) prioritized the departments, i.e. 
the regional governments. This change was a direct reaction to the first elections of 




majorities at the national level in these elections, opposition candidates won in six of the nine 
departments. As a result, when FIDEM was launched in October 2006, USAID directly 
supported Morales’s strongest opponents. 
An additional instrument in the US’ response was the USAID Office of Transition 
Initiatives (OTI). In reaction to the political crisis surrounding Sánchez de Lozada’s 
resignation, OTI launched a programme in March 2004 ‘to help reduce tensions in areas 
prone to social conflict and to assist the country in preparing for key electoral events’. After 
the December 2005 elections, OTI re-targeted its programme towards ‘building the capacity 
of prefect-led departmental governments’. Between March 2006 and June 2007, OTI 
approved more than 100 grants for a total of $4.5 million, which included technical support 




Reflecting this new focus, the outline of US foreign assistance for FY 2008 did not 
even mention the Bolivian central government as a partner. Continued US cooperation with 
the national government notwithstanding,
27
 the document stated that ‘partnerships will be 
developed with regional and local governments and non-governmental organizations (NGO), 
the private sector, and other non-executive branch entities to prevent further erosion of 
democracy, combat cocaine production and trafficking, improve healthcare, and increase 
educational opportunities’. Funding for democracy and governance assistance was to ‘be used 
to strengthen the Congress as well as state and local governments, encourage moderate 
national leaders, support legislation that complies with international standards to combat 
corruption and money laundering, and expand public diplomacy to emphasize the positive 
correlation between democracy and development’. Assistance was also provided ‘to support 
an active, credible civil society […] and to strengthen political parties’.
28
 In addition, the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) more than doubled its grants for activities in 




US shift toward the support of civil society.
29
 
The emphasis on departmental governments – the bastion of the opposition – and 
‘civil society’ aligned perfectly with a strategy explicitly outlined by USAID: to focus 
assistance on ‘the support of counterweights to one-party control such as judicial and media 
independence, a strong civil society, and educated local and state level leaders’.
30
 Given the 
highly sensitive Bolivian government (which had on several occasions denounced US support 
to the opposition), this decidedly political mission was framed and implemented ‘in an 
apolitical, balanced manner’. As a result, support for regional and local authorities included 
assistance for jurisdictions led by representatives from both the opposition and the ruling 
party. US-funded programmes supporting political parties have been limited since late FY 
2007 to ‘multi-party training events so as to ensure a clear public perception of apolitical 
“balance”’, putting on hold ‘[o]ne-on-one political party trainings and consultations, which 
were a key part of a political party strengthening program’.
31
 
This last move has especially affected the local offices of the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) and the National Democratic Institute (NDI). Up until September 2007, IRI 
trained candidates for the Constituent Assembly and NDI organized debates between 
candidates from across the political spectrum. From October 2007 to July 2008, IRI and NDI 
supported political parties (including the governing MAS party), citizen groups, and 
indigenous peoples via multi-party activities such as events and workshops. Even before 
USAID decided to limit party support to multi-party activities (and before Morales’ election), 
the US political party institutes had included MAS in their activities.
32
 However, originally 
USAID’s programme to strengthen political parties was explicitly intended to ‘dovetail’ with 
the (then-governing party) MNR and to ‘help build moderate, pro-democracy political parties 
that can serve as a counter-weight to the radical MAS’.
33
 
The Congressional Budget Justification (CBJ) for FY 2010 signalled important 




government counterparts’ and requested a significant increase in funding to support Integrated 
Justice Centres, a programme implemented in direct cooperation with the Bolivian Ministry 
of Justice. Most notably, a new ‘priority program’ to strengthen the performance of 
municipalities across Bolivia was announced.
34
 This reflected a crucial adjustment to the US 
democracy assistance portfolio. USAID had supported local governments in Bolivia since 
1996, but from 2006 onwards, the new programme FIDEM had prioritized the departmental 
level over the municipal level. However, US support for the departments was met with fierce 
criticism from the Bolivian government, culminating in the expulsion of the US Ambassador. 
With the phase-out of FIDEM in 2009, the US ended support for departmental governments 
and focused again on the municipal level, in line with the demands by the Bolivian 
government. This decision predates Obama’s election, so this change cannot be explained by 
the new president’s revised foreign policy approach. The desire to adjust US democracy 
promotion activities to better match official Bolivian preferences indicates a decision to adapt 
to a government that was likely to remain in power for some time, and signalled an interest by 
the US to remain engaged.
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Before a new USAID democracy programme could be launched, however, a new 
bilateral agreement was needed, which the two governments were unable to successfully 
negotiate. In August 2009, the Bolivian government instructed USAID to halt its democracy 
promotion activities, but signalled its willingness to accept US support for municipal 
governments. Accordingly, in 2009, USAID terminated its democracy and governance 
programmes, ‘with the exception of some municipal strengthening activities’.
36
 NDI also 
halted its Bolivian programme in 2009, after the Bolivian authorities rejected its application 
for registration. Like NDI, IRI also lost USAID funding, but continued to support good 







Bilateral relations between Germany and Bolivia, focused primarily on development 
assistance, have been far less affected by the election of Morales than US-Bolivian relations. 
Indeed, official German reactions to Morales’ victory were decidedly positive. In February 
2006, the Federal Minister for Economic Cooperation and Development Wieczorek-Zeul 
promised to continue supporting Bolivia.
37
 Two months later, she travelled to La Paz to 
‘signal that the Federal Republic [of Germany] is a reliable partner for Bolivia and that we 
support the new government’s efforts especially regarding poverty reduction, nature 
conservation and the strengthening of the rights of the indigenous population’.
38
 The German 
Foreign Office was reportedly not as enthusiastic as the Development Ministry, but did not 
take a public position. Nonetheless, the German Embassy in La Paz was fairly sympathetic to 
the new government, and officially Germany’s position combined hope for political change 
with an offer to support it.
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On the issue of drug policy, Germany had traditionally been sceptical of coerced coca 
eradication, favouring a more cooperative stance. As a result, the German government was 
much less alarmed by the changes in this policy field, announced by the new Bolivian 
government, than the US was. It was primarily the nationalization of gas that was met with 
German scepticism. In fact, this was the only topic that provoked a public statement on 
Bolivia by the German Foreign Minister: In an interview, Frank-Walter Steinmeier expressed 
his ‘great scepticism’ about the decision ‘to nationalize the Bolivian oil and gas industry’.
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However, Wieczorek-Zeul directly responded to Steinmeier, stating that every country should 
‘have the sovereignty to decide how to organize its natural resources’. She argued that it 
would be ‘wrong and counterproductive’ to threaten Bolivia with a suspension of 
development cooperation over ‘business disputes about the status of energy companies’.
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the German Embassy continuously engaged the Bolivian government to reach a negotiated 
solution, and Chancellor Angela Merkel reportedly dedicated a good part of her conversation 
with Morales at the EU-Latin America/Caribbean Summit in Lima in May 2008 to this 
subject. The German government also suspended a climate change and energy project as a 





Development cooperation and democracy assistance 
German development aid to Bolivia has been largely characterized by continuity. With 
Morales barely six months into his first term, the two governments agreed to continue 
German development cooperation in the three established priority areas, ‘water 
supply/sanitation’, ‘sustainable agriculture’ and ‘modernization of state and democracy’. 
However, this continuity has been accompanied by some flexibility from Germany in 
response to the priorities set by the new Bolivian government. For example, in the area of 
democracy assistance, Berlin promised support to the Constituent Assembly. 
In a new country strategy adopted in June 2007, Germany’s Ministry for Economic 
Cooperation and Development stated that the Bolivian government’s ‘new orientation of 
economic and societal policies’ and, in particular, its aim to include the marginalized 
indigenous majority offered ‘new chances for development cooperation’. Although the 
document mentioned the risks of ‘radicalizing political polarization’ and raised ‘doubts’ 
regarding the consistent commitment to ‘democratic rules’ within the ‘very heterogeneous 
MAS movement’, the core problems highlighted were structural ‘deficits’, including socio-
economic inequality, poverty, weak institutional and administrative capacities, corruption, and 
a ‘deficient culture of conflict resolution’. All of these were problems the Morales 
government had inherited and thus required support to address.
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of German development cooperation with Bolivia. The data on German Official Development 
Assistance (ODA) confirms this continuity in both the general amount of aid and the absolute 
size and relative weight of democracy assistance. Indeed, since 2006, Germany has, during 
intergovernmental negotiations, agreed to increase development assistance to Bolivia. In 
2007, the German government promised a total of €52 million for the two years 2007 and 
2008, and in 2009 it agreed to give €62 million for 2009 and 2010. In general, aid in the 
OECD category of ‘Government & Civil Society’ accounted for between one-fifth and one-
third of German ODA to Bolivia. In 2008, new German ODA commitments to Bolivia went 
mainly (60.7%) to the subsector ‘government administration’, with ‘legal and judicial 
development’ and ‘strengthening civil society’ each accounting for 16.7%.
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The most important German aid programme in this area was ‘Decentralized 
Governance and Poverty Reduction Support’ (Programa de Apoyo a la Gestión Pública 
Descentralizada y Lucha contra la Pobreza, or PADEP). This programme was administered 
by the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the organization that 
implemented the bulk of official German technical assistance (until 2011, when it was merged 
into the newly formed Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, or GIZ). 
PADEP began in 2002 with a thematic focus on poverty reduction, decentralization, and 
municipal development, and a regional focus on two particularly poor regions (Norte de 
Potosí and Chaco). The programme was subdivided into different (three to six) components 
that changed frequently. PADEP’s first phase ended in 2005, so that the initiation of the 
second phase (2006–2009) coincided with the change in the Bolivian government. A third and 
final phase (2010–2011) started in 2010. 
The adjustments made to PADEP clearly reflect an adaptation to new Bolivian 
priorities and to the new political setting in general: Cooperation at the national level grew in 
relevance (relative to subnational entities), with much greater focus on structural political 




support the Constituent Assembly, the most important political initiative Morales promoted 
after taking office. This component supported the Bolivian government’s coordinating agency 
representing the presidency (REPAC) that was established in March 2006 to organize the 
assembly and gave direct assistance to the assembly itself, including its directorate, technical 
unit, and commissions.
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 After the end of the Constituent Assembly, PADEP shifted its focus 
to support the constitutional transition process, the implementation of the new constitution, 
and the new parliament (the Asamblea Legislativa Plurinacional). With regards to PADEP’s 
decentralization component, the GTZ worked closely with the Bolivian Ministry of 
Autonomies to support the new process of creating autonomous governments at the 
subnational level. In addition, at the request of the Bolivian government, support for the 




Another adjustment in the German development cooperation concerns an enhanced 
emphasis on crisis prevention and conflict resolution.
47
 One component of PADEP focused on 
‘Constructive Conflict Resolution and Culture of Peace’, and since 2007, German aid has 
implemented instruments including ‘Peace and Conflict Assessments’ and ‘Do No Harm’. 
Germany also planned to introduce a common procedure for all German development 
programmes and projects to identify and eventually avoid conflict-aggravating effects. The 
sensitivity in democracy promotion activities to potential political and conflict-enhancing 
ramifications of supposedly ‘technical’ cooperation seems to have grown. Consequently, 
PADEP’s work with political institutions – national and subnational governments, Parliament, 
the Constituent Assembly – has at least in part shifted from offers of technical advice to 
efforts at promoting dialogue.
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A significant example of the latter is the unofficial role that German development 
cooperation has played in facilitating negotiations between the central government and 




reform. Furthermore, in 2009, GTZ started a new programme (Programa de Fortalecimiento a 
la Concertación y al Estado de Derecho, or CONCED) funded by the German foreign 
ministry to support dialogue processes and improve the rule of law in the implementation of 
the new constitution. An additional project (PROJURIDE), funded by the Development 
Ministry, assists Bolivia’s Ministry of Justice in establishing a new ‘intercultural legal system’ 
in which indigenous jurisdiction is to be given the same weight as formal law, as envisioned 
by the new constitution. 
German democracy assistance as implemented by GTZ is largely aimed at the 
Bolivian government at various state levels and, in general, GTZ is eager to maintain ‘an 
image of neutrality’.
49
 In contrast, Germany’s political foundations take explicit political 
stances. The Social-Democratic Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES), for example, has developed a 
relationship with the governing MAS party. This was not easy, given the foundation’s 
previous engagement with former governments and Bolivia’s ‘traditional’ parties. It also 
represented a clear departure from Germany’s prior position, reportedly taken by the foreign 
ministry, to not cooperate with those opposition forces represented by Morales and the MAS, 
although it did directly follow the German government’s decision to engage the Morales 
government. However, FES’s approach has not involved explicit political support for the 
MAS party.
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 On the other side of the political spectrum, the Hanns Seidel Stiftung (HSS), 
which has close connections to the Germany’s Christian Social Union, has openly supported 
the main opposition party PODEMOS (through the Bolivian political foundation 
FUNDEMOS). Meanwhile, the Christian-Democratic Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS), 
although very critical to Morales in public statements, has implemented relatively neutral 
activities.
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 From these different angles, all three German foundations present in Bolivia have 
contributed to the process of constitutional reforms. In fact, FES played an important role in 







Notwithstanding the general support for Morales, German officials, like their US 
counterparts, have been concerned about what they see as deviance from standards of liberal 
democracy and the rule of law, although they almost always mention this only in private (e.g. 
in interviews). Under certain circumstances, however, German aid activities have been 
suspended. When irregularities and conflicts in the Constituent Assembly peaked in 
December 2006 and again during the Assembly’s final months in 2007, German support for 
the process was suspended (as part of a common European decision). As a reaction to the 
Assembly’s controversial conclusion, Germany stepped back from its original plan to support 
the public dissemination of the draft constitution. Similarly, in 2008 when the opposition 
departments adopted their ‘autonomy statutes’ in referenda lacking any legal basis, 
GTZ/PADEP temporarily abstained from new cooperation initiatives with the departments,  
and made support to them dependent on approval from the Bolivian government, and limited 
support to areas that would not contribute to the process of regional autonomy. Interviews 
conducted with German organizations in Bolivia confirm that these German reactions were 
rooted in a conflict-related aim to ‘do no harm’. Considerations of empirical legitimacy or 
factual approval – not formal legality or democratic correctness – led Germany to suspend or 
reconsider its cooperation. 
 
Dealing with conflicting objectives: A comparative analysis 
The four general conflicts of objectives identified at the beginning of this article were clearly 
relevant for both US and German democracy promotion policies towards Bolivia. 
Unsurprisingly, the varying characteristics of the two ‘donors’ meant that different conflicts 
came to the fore in different shapes and were addressed in different ways. 
Self-determination vs. donor interests: For the US, the political deviance of the 
Bolivian government was particularly relevant in connection to specific US interests in the 




respecting self-determination and ownership. In fact, the US continued (and, as far as the 
Bolivian government allows, still continues) to cooperate in Bolivian counternarcotics efforts. 
However, the US made it clear from the outset that certain issues were non-negotiable 
because they were considered to be vital to US security interests. The certification process and 
the actual ‘de-certification’ of Bolivia is the clearest sign of such explicit limits to the 
principle of self-determination. The US government clearly prioritized counter-narcotics 
related interests over the respect for self-determination. 
With regard to the change in economic policies, both the US and Germany proved 
rather flexible and pragmatic, perhaps because it was obvious that the administration in 
Bolivia enjoyed such broad support that a general attitude of objection would have no effect, 
or perhaps because no major economic interests were involved. The rather intense efforts by 
the German Embassy and even the Chancellor to secure the interests of the one German 
company affected by nationalization (including the decision to suspend a minor development 
cooperation project) suggest a prioritization of economic interests. The German reaction to 
Morales’s claim to self-determination probably would have been much less benign and 
tolerant had there been significant danger to German economic interests. 
Self-determination vs. universalist donor conceptions: With regard to the self-
determined and democratically legitimized deviance from (and, in part, open breach of) 
mainstream standards of liberal democracy and good governance, both the US and Germany 
officially reacted with an attitude of respect for alternative paths and models. Both 
governments continued their development cooperation with Bolivia, and although there were 
some changes in US priorities (away from central government support), the US maintained a 
rather cooperative posture. In fact, USAID proved willing to make significant concessions in 
order to adapt to official Bolivian preferences, i.e. to accept a self-determined path of political 
development even when this implied a partial deviation from the US conception of liberal 




the Morales government, including the Constituent Assembly.
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This partial deviance from what was perceived by both German and US 
representatives as universal standards, however, was still seen as problematic. Alignment with 
Bolivian decisions therefore represented a pragmatic and, in fact, reluctant adjustment, rather 
than a sign of principled respect for self-determination. This adjustment was driven by the 
recognition of broad majority support in Bolivia, the hope to have some moderating influence 
on the Bolivian government, and the strong desire to remain somehow engaged in Bolivia 
(stemming either from the self-interest of the various development agencies to continue their 
work or from the general political assessment that a withdrawal from the country would be 
the worst option). In this sense, the donors’ reactions can be interpreted as attempts to balance 
the recognition of self-determination with the aim to minimize deviance from universally 
conceived standards. A degree of adaption to official Bolivian demands was the dominant 
strategy in this regard, even on the part of US foreign assistance. Negative reactions by the 
US were arguably driven not by considerations related to intrinsic conflicts of objectives but 
by (extrinsic) disagreements in the area of counternarcotics and by what was seen as 
provocation by the Bolivian government. 
Empowerment vs. protection of democracy: Regarding the tension between the 
deepening of democracy (in terms of political empowerment) and its protection (in terms of 
the stability of existing democratic institutions), the unambiguous majority support for and the 
democratic legitimization of every major step in Bolivia’s political transformation have 
proved to be crucial factors. These made it almost impossible for external actors emphasizing 
the importance of democracy to openly reject the political changes promoted by the Bolivian 
government. As a result, the US remained more or less neutral, with some explicit assistance 
to the government, some open help for political and societal counterweights, and some 
dubious support for the departmental opposition. Germany openly supported the dismantling 




in cases where the breach of the democratic/constitutional rules of the game were perceived as 
overly dramatic, the German government decided to suspend its cooperation, but only 
temporarily and only in connection to specific projects. Even in these cases, the German 
decisions to suspend, end, or resume cooperation were driven more by concerns related to 
conflict resolution and intra-state peace than by an adherence to the established institutional 
order. 
Political empowerment vs. intra-state peace: This final observation relates to the 
fourth conflict of objectives where democracy promotion and the aim to uphold intra-state 
peace collide. Germany de facto prioritized conflict prevention and thus intra-state peace. 
This is not to say that Germany tried to limit political empowerment; however, its main aim 
was not to promote the strengthening of formerly marginalized social groups and actors, but 
rather to secure inclusive processes of dialogue and consensus-building. In this regard, 
Germany favoured constraining the emancipatory project of the MAS in order to include the 
(former) elites and middle sectors as much as possible. The idea behind this strategy was that 
the empowerment of the indigenous and poor majority was real and ongoing, but that intra-
state peace was what was truly at risk. 
The US was not in a position to meaningfully contribute to intra-Bolivian dialogue; in 
fact, at least some US policies in Bolivia only increased polarization, since the US 
government was seen as a party to the internal conflict. However, in terms of official 
statements, the US, even if it generally welcomed the growing political inclusion of the 
indigenous and the poor, aimed more at limiting the powers of the newly empowered by 
supporting counterweights to the central government in political parties, civil society, and at 
the subnational level of the state. In general, it seems that neither empowerment nor peace 






The case of Bolivia suggests that the problematique of conflicting objectives is not limited to 
difficult cases of coerced regime change, the democratization of authoritarian regimes, or the 
implementation of democracy in post-conflict societies; rather, it is also an issue democracy 
promoters must deal with in the relatively benign context of post-transition countries. In 
particular, four conflicts of objectives associated with self-determination and empowerment in 
post-transition countries were shown to be relevant: the aim to promote self-determination 
may clash with donor interests or universalist donor conceptions, and the support for 
empowerment can collide with donor objectives related to the protection of democracy and 
intra-state peace. However, the recent and ongoing transformation of Bolivian democracy is a 
unique case, and broader comparative work is therefore required in order to systematically 
identify the types of conflicting objectives, the conditions that give rise to their emergence, 
the ways in which various democracy promoters react, and the effects this can have on 
democracy in recipient countries. 
With these caveats in mind, the analysis shows that conflicts of objectives in 
democracy promotion cannot be reduced to the well-known tension between norms and 
interests. The question of whether external democracy promoters prioritize their particular 
(economic or security) interests or whether they are really willing to promote democracy is 
surely important, but it is only one question among a series of difficult issues. Conflicting 
objectives affect the very business of ‘genuine’ democracy promotion as well: the principles, 
norms, conceptions, and strategies that guide the whole endeavour. A general consequence is 
that critical and decidedly normative reflections on the normative premises and conceptual 
guidelines of democracy promotion are needed. This includes reconsideration of the basic 
assumptions regarding political development that underlie current democracy promotion 
policies. In the aftermath of recent experiences with forced regime change in countries 




shown, there are more general problems of democracy promotion that can also affect 
supposedly easier cases. 
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